The IPCC: Under-financed, overstaffed and ineffective - Part 2: The Stats

In Part 1 of my post on the recent Home Affairs Committee (HAC) report into the IPCC, I sketched out some of the general themes that were apparent. Now, we look at some of the finer detail,  some of the key statistics that there inquiry uncovered and what conclusions if any one might draw from them.

Some of the stats were alluded to in Part 1:

A minority in the wrong:

• In March 2012 there were 134,101 police officers in England and Wales. A total of
31,771 officers were subject to a complaint during 2011–12. 

It is therefore undoubtedly the case that the overwhelming majority of officers are working in good faith, for the public good. Those officers ought not to be grouped amongst those who misuse their position and the trust that is placed them. Equally though, they too must be proactive in rooting out wrongdoers.


You are almost 8 times more likely to die in police custody if you are Black

• In 2011−12, the following fatalities occurred involving the police: 18 road traffic fatalities; 2 fatal police shootings; 15 deaths in custody; 47 other deaths following police contact; and 39 apparent suicides following police custody.

These numbers show a declining trend in the number of deaths involving the police on the IPCC's figures for the previous year. To that limited extent, they provide some positive news in what otherwise continues to be a deeply concerning picture.

• In 2011, 38% of all those who died in police custody were from black or minority
ethnic communities.

These statistics bear out a familiar narrative:

"There is ongoing concern about racism in the police and the IPCC. Black people account for 2.9% of the population, but 20% of those who die in custody. Over 33% of cases in which a black detainee had died occurred in circumstances in which police actions may have been a factor, compared with only 4% of cases where the detainee was white. In 2008 black and minority ethnic communities deaths accounted for 32% of all deaths in police custody, a figure which is broadly consistent with other recent years. Tackling the issue of proper oversight of a potential crime scene involving officers could therefore be an important step in increasing confidence among minority communities."

You are 8 times more likely to die in police custody, if you are Black. How can it be that the police still have not got to grips with this issue? Is it institutional racism, a continuation of the same racial stereotypes that see Black (usually) men treated with a greater degree of suspicion and responded to with greater, sometimes, "unnecessary and unsuitable force"? Or is it rank incompetence? Either way, it is undoubtedly no coincidence. The Committee's recommendation that there be improved training on Discrimination law and public sector duties under the Equality Act 2010 is necessary but not sufficient. Too often such training is held on a par with health and safety training or requring officers to complete Stop Forms - dismissed as an operational inconvenience  There must be a meaningful engagement with any such proposals and an appreciation of the fact that the very future of the organisation depends upon it. 

A mental health crisis

Similar questions must be asked about the Force's inability to deal appropriately with mental health issues:

 • Almost half of those who died in, or shortly after leaving police custody in 2011–12

were identified as having mental health problems.

Startling does not even begin to do just to the fact that a detained person with mental health issues is twice as likely to die in or shortly after leaving police custody when compared with a person without such problems. Putting the two issues together, I for one would not want to be Black and mentally unwell facing a night in the cells. These are issues that should be the source of public outcry. Instead, it is left to bereaved families to lead the campaign through groups such as United Families and Friends for an end to Deaths in Custody (UFFC)

Doing more for less:

• Over the past two years, 63 Commission employees have been made redundant (approximately 15% of the workforce in 2009–10) because of spending cuts.

As with the public sector as a whole, the IPCC is being asked to do more with less.  It has had a 15% cut in its workforce but is expected to supervise 5 different bodies. Its remit expands well beyond the police and includes supervison over complaints against HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the National Crime Agency. In 2008, it was extended to the UK Border Agency (UKBA). The expansion continued, under the  Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 as  with the IPCC now also responsible for deciding whether any criminal allegations relating to the occupant of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) or his Deputy should be investigated. Adding to that load will be the Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and their deputies following their much debated election in November 2012. All of these bodies operates in a different way, in some cases in a completely different environment to that of the police. The IPCC needs more staff and more expertise, not less. As the Home Affairs Committee put it:

"Important cases are [already] under-investigated because of a lack of access to independent specialists. The Home Office should provide the IPCC with a specific budget for a serious cases response team. The resources within individual forces for investigating complaints dwarf the resources of the Commission.  It is notable that the IPCC is smaller than the complaints department of the Metropolitan Police alone. In the most serious cases, therefore, there should be a system for transfer of funds from individual forces to the IPCC to cover an investigation. This model is already in place for the IPCC’s investigations into HMRC and UKBA."

An impotent front line:

To compound matters, the IPCC is also up against a front-line of police complaints, the the Professional Standards departments, that simply is not working:

• During 2011−12, when appeals were made against the way police forces handled a complaint, the IPCC found that the police had been wrong in 31% of all cases. It decided against the police in almost two thirds of appeals where police had decided not to record someone’s complaint.

It is a situation that pleases neither the public, who are given the impression that complaints are not taken seriously, nor the police forces themselves. The feeling that the IPCC are part of the problem remains.  In the words of the National Police Federation:

"The IPCC did not intervene in cases in which PSDs had allegedly conducted a poor, biased or even  corrupt investigation. It believed that the Commission should investigate such allegations, as the perception among officers was that PSDs were a law unto themselves, without the independent scrutiny afforded to all other officers."

Law enforcers running from the law

Questions should be being asked in Parliament and those responsible should be being held to account to the fullest extent of the law but this just isn't happening:

Since 1990, inquests into deaths in police custody have resulted in 9 unlawful killing verdicts, none of which has yet resulted in a conviction.

• From 2008–2011, 8,542 there were allegations of corruption. 837 were referred to the Commission, which independently investigated 21 cases. 18 officers were prosecuted following IPCC investigation and 13 found guilty.

• Every year, around 200 police officers facing disciplinary panels retire or resign in order to avoid misconduct proceedings.

Since 1990, there have been more than 3500 deaths involving the police. That only 9 prosecutions have arisen from those, none of which were for murder or manslaughter, is incomprehensible. The point is, as I mentioned in Part 1, simply underlined by the fact that none of even these few prosecutions has been successful.

It is clear that the IPCC have not made full use of their powers, for example, given the low number of independent investigations it has carried out into allegations of corruption. In light of the comparatively good conviction rate, it might be thought that a greater willingness to conduct their own investigations would result in greater success in dealing with this issue, thereby increasing public confidence.

The ability of officers to resign rather than face disciplinary proceedings is just another indictment on the inability of the IPCC "to get to the truth". What's more, as I understand it, officers are only allowed to do so with the permission of the relevant authority. The apparent collusion of police authorities in enabling their former employees to avoid due process only serves to justify crumbling public confidence.

Conclusion

Out of its origins, the IPCC has spawned into a super-regulator. It has oversight over an ever-increasing range of other public bodies whilst its resources are being cut. While it lacks the essential powers of witness competability and the enforcement of its recommendations, it continually fails to make proper use of those powers it does have.The IPCC was created to secure public confidence in the regulation of the police. However, a toxic combination of a culture of deference towards police officers (a 1/3 of whom go on to staff the Commission) and some fundamental structural limitations mean that the public are no longer sure that there is any body willing or capable of ensuring "that the truth will be told and any wrongs put right." That doubt is warranted. The IPCC has failed. Instead of yet more piecemeal reform, it is time to admit that the numbers do not stack up. The IPCC is a lame-duck regulator living in hope of future redemption. Let's put it out of its misery. The Home Affairs Committee has given us a blue-print, it's time to establish a regulator worthy of the name.